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countries to those recently reformed in Spain. It also analyses the effect that the 
policies of these countries would have if applied in Spain. Results show that 
recent reforms have increased considerably the expenditure on child-targeted 
policies. However, in contrast to the other analysed countries the new Spanish 
system mainly benefits higher income families and has a low poverty reduction 
effect.  
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Higher unemployment and labour market instability, new household forms, decline of fertility 
rates and increasing female labour participation are changing the types of social needs and the 
groups at risk of falling into poverty and social exclusion. Among new social needs, social 
protection for families with children is one of the most evident (Esping-Andersen and Sarassa, 
2002).   
This situation is particularly relevant in Spain, where social expenditure on family benefits is 
very modest. Two recent studies (Abramovici, 2003 and Bradshaw and Finch, 2002) show 
that Spain is one of the countries that spends least on family benefits in the EU. Developing 
child-targeted policies in Spain, following the ones used in other EU countries, could be an 
important strategy in order to reach two important objectives: reducing child poverty and 
easing young couples’ costs of having children.  
The objective of this paper is to analyse how reforming child-related benefits would affect 
public expenditure, income redistribution and child poverty in Spain. Throughout this paper, 
the term “child-related benefits” includes cash social benefits but also related fiscal benefits 
(such as child tax allowances, tax credits or other tax alleviating elements) as well as 
complements to other benefits that are conditional on the existence of children in the 
household. In-kind benefits are not analysed here. After comparing the child-related benefits 
in five EU countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Spain and the UK), this paper analyses two 
types of reforms. Firstly, we examine the recent reforms of child-related benefits implemented 
in Spain in recent years. Secondly, we study what would happen if, instead of these reforms, 
Spain had adopted the benefits that are used in the other countries analysed here. These 
exercises allow us to learn more about alternative ways of reforming Spanish tax-benefit 
system, as well as to examine what could be the effect of an eventual “harmonisation” of child 
oriented policies in the European Union.    
In order to carry out this analysis, we make use of the European tax-benefit model 
EUROMOD. This model, which covers all 15 EU countries, is based on household samples 
that are representative at the national level for each analysed country. See Immervoll et al. 
(1999) for a general description on EUROMOD. 
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The paper is divided into six sections. After this introduction, section 2 briefly compares the 
situation of Spanish children vis-à-vis other EU countries. Section 3 presents some 
methodological issues related to the use of the microsimulation model EUROMOD; how 
simulations were carried out, as well as some definitions. Section 4 describes child-targeted 
policies for each country and compares their outcomes. Section 5 assesses the impact of 
recent reforms implemented in Spain, and simulates replacing these policies by the ones used 
in other EU countries. Conclusions are drawn up in Section 6. 
2  THE SITUATION OF SPANISH CHILDREN IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
Spain is one of the countries with higher child poverty rates in Europe. According to a 
EUROSTAT study, child poverty in Spain is 3 percentage points higher than the average in 
the European Union (Mejer and Siermann, 2000). Moreover, Cantó et al (2002) find that in 
recent years (1990 to 1995) poverty rates among households with children has risen from 20 
to 23 percent. The situation is very different among households without children. During the 
same period, poverty rate in this group fell from 12 to 10 percent. 
There is some general evidence that children have a higher risk of being in poverty. Analysing 
25 industrialised countries, Bradbury and Jäntii (1999) find that child poverty rates are higher 
than the overall poverty rate in 23 countries. Using an equivalence scale that gives less weight 
to children, Mejer and Siermann (2000) find that child poverty is higher than the overall in all 
the EU countries, except Denmark and Greece. This contrasts with the other group that has 
been traditionally thought to be at high poverty risk: the elderly. According to Bradbury and 
Jäntii (1999), in most countries poverty rates among elderly people is lower than the overall 
poverty rate. This is particularly clear in Spain. Ordering thirteen
1 EU countries by overall 
poverty rates, Spain has the fifth highest poverty. Ordered by child poverty, Spain climbs up 
to the third place in the ranking (only UK and Ireland have higher child poverty rates). 
However, among the elderly, Spain falls to the eleventh place. Only the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg have lower elderly poverty rates.    
Many issues are behind the higher poverty risk of children. The most obvious and relevant 
one is the labour force status of their parents. In the past, the “male breadwinner model” 
assumed that the working man was able to earn enough to maintain his family. Therefore, 
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child poverty was associated to the father’s unemployment. Today, higher labour insecurity, 
job change, unemployment spells and precarious work have removed the labour market 
foundations of this model (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Hence, the presence of second earner in 
the household has become decisive in fully covering the family economic needs. Table 1 
shows that children living in families with no earner face the highest poverty risk in all 
selected countries. However, the table also demonstrates that the poverty risk of children 
living in one-earner families is not lower than the overall risk. This is especially relevant in 
Spain, since 55 percent of the children live in one-earner families and the child poverty rate 
across the group is 21 percent.  
A second issue that is often related to child poverty is “family change”. Lone-parenthood is 
the most clear and often-mentioned example of new family arrangements that face high 
poverty risk. Their incapacity to combine full-time work and childcare leads children in this 
type of family to face very high poverty rates (see Table 7). Although child poverty rates in 
lone-parent households are similar to those in other European countries, in Spain (as well as 
in other southern European countries) the number of children living in this type of family is 
still relatively small. According to Table 2, less than 3 percent of Spanish children live in 
lone-parent households. This is in contrast to countries such as Germany or the UK, where the 
proportion is around 20 percent. 
At the same time, unemployment and labour market instability are especially concentrated 
among young adults in Spain. The unemployment rate among those aged under 30 is 2/3 
higher than for the overall population. Moreover, this group faces high job instability. Almost 
60 percent of individuals aged 16 to 29 works under temporary contracts (MTAS, 2000). In 
order to avoid falling into poverty, a large proportion of Spanish young people live with their 
parents. According to Fernández Cordón (1997), 72 percent of Spanish individuals aged 20 to 
29 were living with their parents in 1994. Cantó-Sánchez and Mercader-Prats (1998) show 
that the effects of the presence of young adults in their parents’ households vary drastically 
with their employment status. The presence of employed young adults may protect the family 
from falling into poverty when the head of the household is not working. On the other hand, 
the presence of non employed young adults substantially increases the child poverty risk. 
According to Table 2, while in Spain 30 percent of the children live in households with “other 
                                                                                                                                                          
1 Sweden and Finland were not included in this analysis. 
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adults” besides their parent(s) (in most cases elder siblings), in the other analysed countries 
this proportion ranges between 10 and 16 percent. At the same time, Table 7 shows that the 
child poverty risk is significantly high in this group in Spain. This indicates that, in average, 
the presence of young adults in the household increases the poverty risk of children.  
Delaying independence also gives the young an opportunity to save income to face the future 
costs of having a family. Most Spanish youngsters leave the parental home when they are 
ready to face these costs. Martínez and Ruiz-Castillo (2002) find that the decisions to leave 
home and to get married are simultaneous among Spanish youth. Furthermore, Ahn and Mira 
(2001) show that, besides marriage, the decision to have the first child is also conditional on 
leaving the parental home. Therefore, the delay in young people’s independence is reducing 
the fertility period of young couples and is one of the causes of the fall in fertility in Spain. 
According to EUROSTAT (2002), the fertility rate in Spain, in 2001, was 1.25 children per 
woman of fertile age, while the average in the EU was 1.47. Almost 50 percent of Spanish 
adults think that they have fewer children than they would like to. More than 80 percent of 
these adults point to economic reasons to explain why they do not have more children (CIS, 
1998).  
On the other hand, Spain is one of the countries that spends least on family and child 
protection in the EU. According to Abramovici (2003), only 2.7 percent of total social 
benefits were spent on family or children benefit in Spain in 2000. This contrast with 8.2 
percent spent in average in the EU
2. Besides the small expenditure, the design of child 
protection in Spain is also unsatisfactory. Sutherland (2001c) simulates the effects of 
increasing the amount of child benefits by a same proportion in four EU countries. Results 
show that a similar proportional increase in aggregate expenditure (as percentage of aggregate 
household disposable income) would reduce child poverty by 11 percent in Denmark and 
France, 13 percent in the UK and only 2 percent in Spain. 
Therefore, reforming child-targeted policies in Spain could be an effective means to achieve 
two objectives that are of increasing importance in the Spanish political agenda. First, better 
child-oriented policies could reduce child poverty considerably. Second, policies that reduce 
the costs of having children could also provide an incentive for earlier leaving of the parental 
home and higher fertility.  
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3 METHODOLOGICAL  ISSUES 
This paper makes use of the static microsimulation model EUROMOD. This model calculates 
taxes and benefits for each individual of a micro-data sample that is representative of the 
population at the national level. This allows us to assess the effect of tax-benefit reforms on 
individual’s disposable income. Tax-benefit microsimulation models provide many 
advantages in comparison to other empirical methods of tax-benefit analysis. First, the use of 
representative micro-data not only ensures that the analysis takes into account the diversity of 
individual and household circumstances but also the frequency in which these circumstances 
occur in the population. Comparing to other methods that provide illustrative evidence (such 
as “model families”, comparison of policy rules or aggregate statistics), microsimulation is a 
step forward, since results obtained are representative. Furthermore, instead of taking the tax-
benefit system as a black box (getting the amount of taxes and benefits exogenously), 
microsimulation allow us to understand the system from inside it. Finally, these models can 
simulate tax-benefit reforms, anticipating effects of future policies or alternative reform 
scenarios. 
3.1  Model and Data 
EUROMOD is a tax-benefit microsimulation model for the 15 European Union countries. 
Using micro-data that is representative at the national level and comparable across countries, 
this model is a powerful instrument for research on tax-benefit reform in a comparative 
perspective
3. Currently, EUROMOD simulates great part of personal taxes and social benefits 
of the 1998 tax-benefit system
4. For a description of the assumptions behind the calculations 
and a discussion of issues affecting the quality and comparability of results see Sutherland 
(2001a). 
EUROMOD is a static model based upon purely arithmetical calculations. Individual 
behaviour or reactions to tax-benefit reforms are not considered in the simulations. The 
underlying assumption is that individuals do not change their behaviour after the reform. 
                                                                                                                                                          
2 It should also be stressed that Spain has one of the lowest expenditures on social protection in EU.  
3 Immervoll et al (2000) and Sutherland (2001c) are examples of previous studies that have used EUROMOD for 
comparative child policy analysis. 
4 A new version with 2001 tax-benefit systems will be ready by the end of 2003. 
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Although this hypothesis is not realistic to analyse effects in the long-run, it is accepted that 
they are valid for short-run (first degree) analysis. 
3.2 Simulations 
The objective of the simulations is to assess the effect of “child-targeted policies”. In our 
simulations, child-targeted policies include not only those formally oriented to children, such 
as child benefits. Elements of policies that are conditional or related to the existence of 
children (such as day care, housing and social assistance benefits) are also analysed here. 
Identifying which part of these policies is for children is not always clear-cut. In order to 
assure a consistent comparison across countries we need to establish a common criterion. The 
criterion used in this paper is that the policy must relate to “strict childhood”. This means that 
only policies with eligibility or amount conditional on the existence of an individual who is 
defined as “a dependent child under 18” are taken as child-targeted policies. The term strict is 
associated to the age limit. If, for instance, a benefit is given to all children under age 21, then 
the part of the benefit given to children under 18 is considered in the analysis. The benefit 
paid for individuals aged 18 to 21 is not considered a “child-targeted policy”. Moreover, in 
the case of policies not exclusively targeted to children (such as social assistance or housing 
benefits), only the part conditional to the existence of children is computed
5.  
It should be noticed that due to lack of data in EUROMOD, this paper neither includes nor 
simulates in-kind benefits or public provided services. This is an important limitation in the 
analysis. Non-cash benefits have an important effect on family and child welfare and play a 
major role on the policy debate in most countries. Bradbury and Jäntii (1999) suggest that 
comparisons of child poverty rates across countries may not change much including or not 
including non-cash benefits
6.  In addition, Smeeding and Rainwater (2002) note, “while non-
cash benefits as a percent of GDP are far more equal across nations than are cash benefits, 
(…) the nations that spend the most in cash incomes (…) also spend the most on health and 
education combined”. The same tendency is found when analysing family benefits in 
continental Europe, Ireland and the UK. However, this trend does not hold when 
Scandinavian countries are included. In contrast to other EU countries, where in-kind benefits 
                                                 
5 For example, the British Income Support is paid to low-income family units with or without children. However, 
the amount of the benefit increases if the individual or couple has a child. This “complement” for having 
children is computed as a child-targeted policy. 
  6 
represent about one quarter of total family/child benefits, in EU Scandinavian countries the 
share is close to half (Abramovici, 2002). Therefore, all results, but particularly those for 
Denmark, should be interpreted with caution
7. 
Nonetheless, cash benefits are relevant policy tools for child-oriented tax-benefit reforms. In 
many cases, cash benefits are able to offer similar protection to non-cash benefits (for 
instance, childcare benefits could have an effect similar to public-provided or subsidised 
crèches). Moreover, given that they do not induce or restrict consumption to a  particular 
pattern determined by the government, cash benefits are less paternalistic and have a clearer 
incidence (at least at the household level).  
Table 3 lists each country’s child-targeted policies that are assessed in this paper. In order to 
have a better understanding of the structure implemented in each country, child-targeted 
policies are classified into six policy types: (1) tax reliefs, (2) income-related child benefits, 
(3) non-income-related child benefits, (4) childcare benefits, (5) housing benefits and (6) 
social assistance. Tax reliefs include all child-targeted elements of the income tax or social 
insurance contributions that may alter the tax liability. This category includes tax allowances 
and tax credits, as well as other child-related tax instruments such as the French family ratio 
(quotient familial). Income-related child benefits comprise all child benefits that are income-
tested, while non-income-related child benefits are those not conditional on current income. 
Childcare benefits are those cash benefits paid for day-care expenditure on children. Housing 
and social assistance benefits are designed to protect other social needs. However, in many 
countries these benefits are more generous for families with children. We assess these extra 
levels of generosity as child-related policies. 
The expenditure on child-targeted policies is assessed as the difference in household 
disposable income before and after excluding these policies from the tax-benefit system. This 
is carried out by running two simulations: one with the whole tax-benefit system and another, 
defined as the “baseline”, which excludes the child-targeted policies from the system.  
In section 5.2, we simulate the child-targeted policies from the countries apart from Spain. It 
is relatively easy to simulate one country’s policy into another using EUROMOD. The 
                                                                                                                                                          
6 Whiteford et al (1994) find that, despite differences in level, child poverty rates including and not including 
education and health benefits are strongly correlated.  
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countries’ databases use common names and definitions for most relevant variables (such as 
sources of income or demographic and labour characteristics). Therefore, the database from 
country “A” can be used to run the tax-benefit system in country “B”. Likewise, the model 
structures most tax-benefit policies using functions that are suitable for all countries.  Hence, 
a certain policy from country “A” can be promptly transferred and simulated in country “B”. 
However, some policies require very complicated operations or unusual variables that are not 
available in all countries. For this reason, some policies use country specific functions that 
cannot be directly transferred to other countries.  
All policies that use common or country specific functions that require variables available in 
the Spanish data were simulated as they are in the original country. However, some policies 
use functions that need variables that are not available for Spain. In these cases, similar 
functions that do not require the “unusual” variable replaced those ones
8. All monetary 
parameters were exchanged to 1998 Spanish pesetas using Purchasing Power Parities 
published by the OECD (2003). 
Finally, all simulations assume that all units (individuals, families or households) entitled to a 
benefit or tax relief claim and correctly receive it. In short, we assume full take-up in all 
countries and simulations. The only exception is Germany. There is a high discrepancy 
between the number of simulated entitlements in EUROMOD and the number of recipients of 
social assistance and housing benefits in the German database (GSOEP). According to 
Mantovani and Sutherland (2003), EUROMOD simulations assuming full take-up would 
underestimate the headcount ratio for children aged under 15 by 5 percentage points, in 
comparison to the number published by Eurostat (based on the ECHP 1998). For this reason, 
the German social assistance and housing benefits are only simulated for those people who 
report to receive them in the original data
9. 
                                                                                                                                                          
7 According to Abramovici (2002), Denmark is the country with highest proportion of family/child social 
protection spent on in-kind benefits (60 percent of total family/children protection).   
8 For instance, the UK Income Support is means-tested for capital assets. The Spanish data does not have 
information on capital assets. As a result, the Income Support simulated in Spain does not include this means 
test. Nevertheless, other income-test conditions that require data available for Spain were kept in the simulation. 
This change is expected to produce hardly any effect because few low-income families with children have much 
capital. 
9 For more details about the quality of the simulations see Grabka (2001) and Mantovani and Sutherland (2003). 
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3.3 Definitions 
This paper adopts the measures most frequently used in the literature on income inequality 
and poverty. Differences in household size and composition are dealt with applying the 
modified OECD equivalence scale suggested by EUROSTAT.
10 Throughout the analysis, we 
assume that household income is equally shared among all household members. Therefore, 
individual well-being is directly linked to the household disposable income. Nevertheless, the 
unit of analysis is the individual.  
Following UNICEF’s recommendation, children are defined as all household members less 
than 18 years of age. Finally, the poverty line is set to 60 percent of the median of equivalent 
disposable income in the “baseline scenario”
11. The poverty line is fixed and used in all 
reform scenarios. Poverty incidence, intensity and severity are measured using FGT indexes 
α=0 to 2 (Foster et al, 1984).
12  
4  CHILD-RELATED BENEFITS IN EU COUNTRIES IN 1998 
4.1 Policy  Description 
This section briefly describes child-related benefits in each country in 1998. The Appendix 1 
presents each policy simulated by EUROMOD in further detail.
13 It should be noticed that in 
some countries family policies have been significantly reformed in recent years. Therefore, some 
policies described here are quite different from the ones that are in use presently
14.  
4.1.1 Denmark   
The most relevant policy in Denmark is the family allowance, which is paid to all families 
with children under 18. This benefit is complemented with other non-income-related benefits 
                                                 
10 The modified OCDE equivalence scale gives weight 1 for the first adult, 0.5 for remaining adults and 0.3 for 
children under 14 years of age.  
11 Recall that the “baseline scenario” is each country’s 1998 tax-benefit system excluding all child-targeted 
policies. 
12 See Lambert (2001, chapter 6) for a recent survey on poverty measurement. 
13 National tax-benefit systems and the ways they are modelled in EUROMOD are documented in EUROMOD 
Country Reports: Hansen (2001) for Denmark, Bargain and Terraz (2001) for France, Grabka (2001) for 
Germany, Levy and Mercader-Prats (2001) for Spain and Sutherland (2001b) for the UK. 
14 Description of recent changes in the British system can be found at Sutherland and Pichaud (2001) and Brewer 
et al (2001). An excellent description of family benefits in all EU countries can be found at website of the 
European Observatory of National Family Polices Recent changes in Spain are presented in the next section. 
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that are paid to lone and disabled parents as well as families with twins. Lower income 
families may also be eligible for further benefits. Childcare expenses are subsidised for 
families with income below a certain limit. The amount of income-tested housing and social 
assistance benefits also increase with the presence of children in the household.   
Most child benefits in Denmark are aimed at dependent children under 18. They are paid per 
child and do not vary with special circumstances.  The main exception is the Family Benefit, 
whose amount per child decreases with the age of the child. These benefits are not included in 
the income test of any benefit and only social assistance is taxable. 
4.1.2 France 
The most important child-targeted policy in France is the Family Benefit (FB). This benefit 
has been always non-income related. However, in 1998 it was exceptionally conditional on 
income. Following a clear pro-natal objective, FB is granted only to families with two or 
more children and the amount increases more than proportionally with every additional child.  
Other income-related benefits target small children (Young Children Allowance, YCA), 
families with three or more children (Family Complement, FC), and children in education 
(Education Related Family Benefit, ERFB). Low-income families are also protected by the 
Housing Benefit (HB), Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG) and Lone Parent Benefit (LPB).  
The tax system benefits families with children through the Quotient Familial (QF) in the 
income tax and in the special contributions on pensions and unemployment benefits. This 
instrument divides the tax base by an amount that increases with the number of children. The 
same amount multiplies the computed tax (after applying the tax rate) to obtain the total tax 
liability.   
There is not a universal definition of a child in the French system. The QF has the broadest 
child definition (24 year-old individuals in education and with low income are considered 
children). Most policies increase the amount of the benefit more than proportionally with 
every additional child. Finally, all child benefits (except ERFB) are included in the MIG’s 
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income test. Therefore, for low-income families, the MIG’s rules prevail completely over the 
ones of the various child benefit instruments
15.   
4.1.3 Germany   
The most important child-targeted policy in Germany is the Child Benefit (CB). This is a 
universal benefit that is paid to all families with children. However, some high-income 
individuals find more profitable to replace the CB with the Child Tax Allowance.  
Other child-targeted policies are restricted to lone parents (Lone Parent Tax Allowance), and 
to mothers of very young children who work less than 19 hours a week (Child raising 
allowance, CRA), or who do not work at all (Postnatal Benefit, PB). On the other hand, the 
amount of the German housing and social assistance benefits also increase with the presence 
of children in the household.  
The definition of a child is quite generous in most German benefits. Low-income, 
unemployed individuals are considered children until 27 years of age in the Child Tax 
Allowance and Child Benefit. Most policies pay the same amount per each additional child; 
the main exception is the CB, whose amount increases more than proportionally with every 
extra child. Finally, the amounts of the social assistance benefits and child raising allowances 
increase with the age of the child. 
4.1.4 United  Kingdom 
In line with the countries described above, the British system is also based on a universal 
benefit complemented with income-related-benefits. However, the amount of the universal 
child benefit (CB) in the UK is around half the amount in the other countries; in PPP euros 
(see Appendix 1). Moreover, this benefit is counted in the income test of the Income Support, 
Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. Since Income Support has a 100 percent 
withdrawal rate, recipients of this benefit have their child benefit “effectively taxed” at 100 
percent tax rate
16.  
                                                 
15 I thank Olivier Bargain for this comment. 
16 This view about the relation between CB and IS differs from the standard one in the UK.  The practice in 
Britain is that the child benefit is automatically paid to all children and the Income Support amounts are set as a 
complement. I thank Holly Sutherland for this comment.  
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Children living in low-income families with at least one working parent may also benefit from 
Family Credit. The amount of this income-related benefit increases with the number and age 
of children, and the number of hours worked by the parents. The existence of children in the 
household also increases the amount of the housing (HB) and council tax benefit (CTB).  
At the same time, lone parents, disabled people, pensioners and unemployed who do not work 
more than 16 hours per week may be eligible to Income Support. The maximum amount of 
this income-tested benefit increases with every additional child, although that less than 
proportionally. IS’s maximum amount also increases with child age and in lone parent 
households.  
The UK is the only analysed country with a standard definition of dependent children. All 
child-targeted polices in the UK in 1998 are focused on individuals under 16 years of age or 
under 19 if in full-time non-advanced education. The British system also implicitly assumes a 
decreasing “marginal cost of children”, since all benefits pay higher individual amounts for 
the first child. Finally, the system also implicitly considers older children and lone parent 
households to have higher needs. 
4.1.5 Spain 
Spain is widely known for its underdeveloped system of child protection (Bradshaw and 
Finch, 2002). In 1998, there were only two national child-targeted policies in Spain: an 
income tax Child Tax Credit and an income-tested Child Benefit (Prestación por hijo a 
cargo). The Child Tax Credit was available for children less than 30 years of age, was not 
refundable and increased more than proportionally with the number of children in the 
household. The child benefit pays the same amount to all children less than 18 years of age 
that live in low-income families. 
4.2 Policy  Outcomes 
4.2.1  Expenditure and coverage  
Table 4 shows the aggregate expenditure on child-targeted policies (including tax reliefs) as a 
percentage of aggregate household disposable income in 1998. France is the analysed country 
that spent most on child-targeted policies, with an aggregate expenditure that is equivalent to 
4.4 percent of the aggregate household disposable income. On the other hand, in 1998, Spain 
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spent less than 0.7 percent of its aggregate household disposable income on child-targeted 
policies. Aggregate expenditure in Denmark, Germany and the UK was around 3 percent of 
disposable income.  
Non-income-related child benefits are the greatest source of expenditure in all countries 
except Spain. However, the share of these benefits on the overall expenditure ranges from 
around 90 percent in Denmark to 40 percent in France. On the other hand, Denmark is the 
only country without income-related child benefits. In the other countries these benefits 
represent between 10 and 20 percent of the overall expenditure. Tax benefits are important in 
France, but especially in Spain where they represent almost 80 percent of the total 
expenditure. Supplements for the existence of dependent children are considerable in British 
and Danish social assistance benefits and in the French and Danish housing benefit.  
Given the existence of universal benefits, the Danish and German child systems cover all 
children under 18. The UK has also a universal benefit (Child Benefit). However, since its 
definition of a dependent child does not include people aged 16 or 17 who are not in full-time 
non-advanced education, 2 percent of British children under 18 do not receive any benefit. In 
France, the non-income-related benefit (Family Benefit) is paid only to families with at least 
two children. Moreover, in 1998 this benefit was income tested. As a result, in 1998 the 
French system did not cover 3.6 percent of children under 18.  In Spain, almost 96 percent of 
the children under 18 were protected by some child-targeted policy. The great majority (79 
percent) gained from the Child Tax Credit, while the income-tested Child Benefit covered 
only 19 percent. 
4.2.2  The distribution of child-related benefits per income decile 
Table 5 shows the average expenditure per child and deciles, normalised by overall average 
expenditure per child
17. The expenditure is negatively correlated with income in all countries.  
This negative correlation is clear in Denmark and the UK throughout the income distribution. 
In France, Germany and Spain expenditure increases in the top.  
Figure 1 shows that very different policy combinations achieve this somewhat similar pattern 
of distribution. In all countries the higher expenditure on low-income children is due to the 
                                                 
17 Deciles were calculated using equivalent household disposable income as described in section 3.3. 
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use of income-related child benefits and supplements for children in other income-related 
benefits, such as social assistance and housing benefit. However, in Denmark this is also due 
to the fact that non-income related child benefits are higher for lone parents and for 
households with younger children
18. Denmark, Germany and the UK level the expenditure per 
child in the middle of the income distribution using non-income-related child benefits. France 
and Spain achieve the same result by balancing out the progressivity of the income-related 
benefits with the regressivity of the tax reliefs. Finally, the relatively high expenditure on rich 
children in France, Germany and Spain is due to the existence of tax reliefs. 
4.2.3 Child  poverty 
Child-targeted policies are effective reducing child poverty in all analysed countries, except in 
Spain. Table 6 shows that, in relative terms, the reduction in child poverty headcount ranges 
from 29 percent in the UK to 63 percent in France. In contrast, child-related policies reduce 
the child poverty headcount by less than 8 percent in Spain. As a result, before including 
child-targeted policies, child poverty incidence in Spain is about 4 percentage points lower 
than in Germany and France. After child-targeted policies are included, child poverty 
incidence in Spain is 7 and 11 percentage points higher than these countries, respectively.  
Regarding poverty intensity and severity, Table 6 shows that the French and the British 
policies are the most effective at reducing these indexes of child poverty. The reduction in 
child poverty intensity and severity is much lower in Spain. As a consequence, Spain has the 
highest poverty intensity level (FGT, α=1) among the analysed countries. Due to non-take-up 
of income related and social assistance benefits
19, child poverty severity (FGT, α=2) in 
Germany is higher than any other analysed country.  
4.2.4  The distribution of child-related benefits by household types and number of children 
in the household 
Child-targeted policies are particularly generous to lone-parent families. Table 7 shows that 
the expenditure per child in lone-parent households is greater than the overall average in all 
                                                 
18 In France and Germany non-income-related benefits also decrease with income. However, this is because the 
French Family Benefit was income tested in 1998, and German better-off households replace the Child Benefit 
with the Child Tax Allowance. 
19 In Germany the take-up of housing benefit and social assistance is taken from the data (see section 3.2).  
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countries, with Denmark being by far the most generous case. In contrast, there is not a 
common pattern of distribution of expenditure per number of children in the household. Table 
8 reveals that while France, Spain and Germany spend relatively more on children living in 
large families, Denmark and the UK are more generous to children without siblings. 
The poverty reducing effect of child policies by household types is significantly different 
across countries. Table 7 reveals that the French and Danish lone parent policies are 
particularly effective reducing child poverty in lone parent households. Policies in Germany 
and France are also very effective reducing child poverty in households with three children or 
more. On the other hand, child policies in the UK and Denmark are more effective at reducing 
poverty among children living in households with one or two children. Finally, Spanish 
policies are relatively more effective at reducing child poverty among lone parents and 
couples and in households with two or more children. 
5  REFORMING SPANISH CHILD-RELATED BENEFITS 
5.1 Recent  Reforms 
In recent years, family-oriented policies became a crucial element in the Spanish policy 
debate. The Spanish National Action Plan for Inclusion (NAPIncl), submitted to the EU in 
2001, includes the “Plan for Family Support” (Plan Integral de Apoyo a la Familia 2001-
2004) as one of its cornerstones. The objectives of this Plan are to reconcile work and family 
life, to improve the families’ life standards and to allow the principle of demographic 
continuity through generational replacement. Regarding in-cash child policies, the main 
measures proposed deal with increasing the expenditure on tax reliefs, increasing the income 
threshold and compensating the work of mothers with young children.  
Many of plan’s proposals were implemented in the 2003 tax-benefit system. This presents 
three notable changes with respect to the system analysed in the previous section. First, the 
child tax credit was replaced by a more generous tax allowance. Second, the amount and the 
income-test of the child benefit were increased. Third, a refundable tax credit for working 
mothers with children aged under three was introduced. Although formally it is a tax relief, in 
practice the working mother refundable tax credit can be interpreted as a non-income-related 
benefit, since the mother does not have to be a taxpayer to receive it. Therefore, this new 
policy actually represents the introduction of the first non-income-related benefit in Spain.  
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In this section, we simulate the child-targeted policies for Spain in 2003, using the 1998 tax-
benefit system as baseline. All policies, except those related to children, are taken from the 
1998 system. However, since the effective impact of a tax allowance on disposable income 
depends on the tax rate, most elements of the 2003 income tax are also included in this 
simulation
20.  
5.1.1  Expenditure and coverage  
Recent reforms have increased significantly the expenditure on child-related benefits in Spain. 
According to Table 9, if 2003 policies have been implemented in 1998, aggregate tax-benefit 
expenditure on children would represent 1.3 percent of overall household disposable income 
(90 percent increase with respect to the 1998 system).  
Most of the increase was due to the more generous child tax allowances, which represent 0.9 
percent of aggregate household disposable income. The new working mother refundable tax 
credit costs 0.2 percent of aggregate income, exceeding the expenditure on the income-tested 
Child Benefit.  
The system of 2003 reduces the percentage of children who receive some benefit. The 
percentage of children covered by the system falls from 96 percent, using the 1998 system, to 
93.3 percent. The reason for this apparent contradiction is found in the tax cut and the nature 
of the tax allowances. The tax cut has reduced the number of taxpayers in 2003 with respect 
to 1998
21. Since the child tax allowance is not refundable, individuals who do not pay enough 
income tax do not benefit from it. On the other hand, the new working mother tax credit is 
refundable. However, since it is targeted to working mothers with infants it only benefits 
635,000 children (8 percent of the Spanish population under 18).  
5.1.2  The distribution of child-related benefits per income decile 
As already observed in other studies
22, high-income households are the ones who gain most 
from replacing tax credits with tax allowances. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
expenditure per child under the 2003 system increases with household income (see Table 10). 
                                                 
20 The monetary variables of all 2003 policies were deflated to 1998 levels using Consumer prince index. 
21 See Levy and Mercader (2003) for details on the Spanish income tax reform. 
22 See for example Parker and Sutherland (1991). 
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Furthermore, in Spain most working mothers live in middle and high-income households. 
Consequently, the new working mother tax credit reinforces this regressive effect (see 0). On 
the other hand, the level of expenditure is especially low among children in the second decile. 
This is due to a discontinuity in the new Spanish system. In one hand, the child benefit is 
targeted on households with very low income; hence many children in the second decile are 
not eligible for this benefit. In the other, their household income is not large enough to pay 
income tax, thus they do not benefit from child tax allowances either. 
5.1.3 Child  poverty 
Given that most of the rise in the expenditure benefits children living in better-off households, 
the recent reforms have little impact on child poverty. Table 11 shows that the child poverty 
incidence under the 2003 system is just 0.2 percentage points lower than under the 1998 
system. The small reduction, in comparison to the 1998 system, of the poverty intensity index 
and the maintenance of the poverty severity also demonstrate that the reform fails to improve 
the targeting to the more vulnerable among the poor.  
It should be noticed that the simulations use a sample that is representative of the Spanish 
population in 1998. Therefore, results are not necessarily accurately representing the situation 
of Spanish children in 2003. Nevertheless, these can be interpreted as the effect that the 2003 
child-related benefits would have had if it had been implemented in 1998 tax-benefit system. 
5.1.4  The distribution of child-related benefits by household types and number of children 
in the household 
The recent reforms have considerably changed the distribution of the expenditure per 
household type in Spain. Following Table 12, only children living in households formed by 
“traditional families” (couple plus children under 18) receive more protection than the 
average. Moreover, Table 13 shows that children living in one-child households are the main 
beneficiaries after the reform. These results are somewhat unexpected. The child tax 
allowance in the 2003 system is particularly generous to families with three or more children. 
Hence, it would be expected that children living in such households would be the main 
beneficiaries. Again, the reason for this unexpected result is the fact that the effective amount 
of the child tax allowance depends on the amount of the tax base (see section 5.1.1). The 
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results obtained suggest that households with one dependent child have a greater probability 
of making effective use of higher child tax allowances  
The reform has also reduced the income tax exemption limit for lone parent families using the 
joint scheme of taxation
23. As a result, children in lone parent families are no longer receiving 
more benefits than the average. Moreover, the poverty incidence for children living in large 
lone-parent families (which is the group with highest poverty risk) increases 9.5 percentage 
points under the 2003 system. 
5.2  Introducing EU child-targeted policies in Spain 
This section assesses what would have happened if the child-targeted policies from the other 
countries analysed in section 4 (“other countries” hereafter) had been implemented in Spain in 
1998. Due to lack of data, housing and childcare benefits were not simulated in Spain. This is 
omission especially relevant in the case of the French and Danish systems since these benefits 
have a considerable share of the overall expenditure and are very important for low-income 
households. The German child tax allowance was also not simulated because of the 
complicated interaction it produces between the income tax and the child benefit. Since, this 
tax allowance only benefits high-income taxpayers the simulation of the German system in 
Spain is less generous than expected to better off children. Finally, all simulations assume full 
take-up. This is consistent with the assumption used in the simulations in section 4, except for 
German social assistance and housing benefits
24. Therefore, these benefits are probably 
overestimated in the Spanish simulations.  
5.2.1  Expenditure and coverage  
The results presented in section 4.2.1 suggest that the French system is the most expensive of 
those examined. However, Table 9 shows that the German system would be the most costly if 
implemented in Spain. Two reasons explain this result. First, the simulations with Spanish 
data do not include housing benefit, which are a relatively expensive policy in France. 
Second, Germany is the analysed country with least share of population under 18
25. Hence, 
                                                 
23 Under the 1998 system, the joint scheme exemption limit for lone-parent families and for couples was the 
same. In 2003, the exemption limit for lone-parents is 20 percent lower than for couples. 
24 Recall section 3.2. 
25 According to the datasets used by EUROMOD, the percentage of population under 18 is 19% in Germany, 
20% in Spain, 23% in Denmark and 24% in France and the UK. 
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the lower cost of child-related benefits in Germany, as percentage of aggregate household 
disposable income, is not related to a higher generosity of the French system but to a lower 
proportion of children in Germany.  
The non-inclusion of housing and day care benefits in the simulations also reduces the 
potential cost of the Danish system simulated in Spain. As a result, the Danish system would 
be the least expensive of the analysed systems to implement in Spain.  
The simulation of the British system in Spain also provides very interesting results. While in 
the UK the expenditure on Income Support’s supplement for children is appreciably higher 
than the Family Credit, in Spain results are reversed.  This difference is explained by the fact 
that the percentage of children living in families with no working parents in the UK is double 
the percentage in Spain
26. As a result, there are considerably more families eligible for FC in 
Spain than in the UK. In addition, the Family Credit is considerably more generous to the first 
child and to older children. Spanish children are in average older than British children and a 
higher percentage of them live in one-child households. These factors explain part of the 
higher cost of FC in Spain
27.  
Regarding the coverage, the German and the Danish systems assure some protection to all 
children under 18. Meanwhile, the exclusion of people aged 16 or 17 who are not in full-time 
non-advanced education, would leave 1.5 percent of Spanish children unprotected by the 
British system. In the case of the French system, 4.5 percent of the children would not be 
protected because the Family Benefit is not paid to children living in one-child households. 
5.2.2  The distribution of child-related benefits  
The distribution of overall child-related benefits would generally maintain in Spain the same 
pattern they have in their original countries. However, the non-inclusion of some of the 
policies causes some variations. Therefore, the Danish and the French systems are less 
progressive than originally because the housing and day care benefits are not included in the 
                                                 
26 See Table 1. This difference is considerably higher among low-income households. In the UK, only 39% of 
children in the first decile live in households with at least one employed member. In Spain, 67% of children in 
the first decile live in this type of households.  
27 The family credit pays higher supplements for children aged 11 or more and is particularly generous to those 
aged 16 or more. According to the datasets used by EUROMOD, 28 percent of British children are aged 11-15 
and 10 percent are age 16+. In Spain these proportions are 30 and 14 percent, respectively. 
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simulations. On the other hand, the non-inclusion of the child tax allowance makes the 
German system slightly less generous to children in the top of the income distribution.   
Nevertheless, the most remarkable difference takes place with the British system. 0 shows that 
the Family Credit would be extremely generous for children in the bottom part of the income 
distribution in Spain. As a result, the British system would be the most generous to children 
living in low-income households.     
5.2.3 Child  poverty 
The systems of all analysed countries would significantly reduce child poverty in Spain. Of 
course, the extent of this reduction is related to the aggregate expenditure and the efficiency 
targeting on the poor. Therefore, it is not surprising that the British system would be the most 
effective reducing child poverty in Spain. According to Table 11, if the British system had 
been implemented in Spain in 1998 only 8 percent of Spanish children would have been left 
poor. Great part of this reduction is due to the British family credit. This benefit alone would 
be able to reduce child poverty incidence by 10 percentage points. The Danish and the 
German non-income-related benefits achieve similar levels of poverty reductions, however 
these benefits would cost substantially more than the FC (see Table 9).  
5.2.4  The distribution of child-related benefits by household types and number of children 
in the household 
In contrast to the Spanish 2003 system, the child-targeted policies from other countries would 
be relatively more generous to non-traditional families. According to Table 12, children in 
lone parent households would receive benefits well above the overall average. As a result, a 
substantial proportion of children in this household type would escape poverty. The most 
impressive example is the Danish system that would bring poverty incidence among children 
in lone parent households down to one digit. These systems would also be quite generous to 
children in households with “other adults”. However, in many cases the benefits are not 
enough to compensate the fact children in this group face high poverty gaps
28. As a result, the 
poverty reduction effect on this group is lower than on the overall population. 
                                                 
28 Results on poverty intensity and severity by household types are not presented in the paper but are available by 
request. 
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These systems (except the Danish) also diverge from the Spanish by being relatively more 
generous to large families. As a result, these policies would substantially reduce child poverty 
in households with 3 or more children. The German and the British systems would especially 
effective reducing poverty across this group. More than 60 percent of the children in large 
families would leave poverty if those systems were implemented in Spain. 
6 CONCLUSION 
This paper has analysed the recent tax-benefit reforms of policies oriented to children in 
Spain, in a European context. The analysis was carried out using the microsimulation model 
EUROMOD. Tax-benefit microsimulation models provide many advantages in comparison 
with other empirical methods of tax-benefit analysis: representative results, possibility of 
assessing interactions or parts of policies separately, and potential to simulate tax-benefit 
reforms.  
Results obtained in this paper show that the tax-benefit expenditure on children in Spain is 
much lower than in the other EU countries analysed here. Furthermore, Spain is the only 
analysed country that uses tax reliefs as the main child-targeted policy. Since this type of 
policies benefit principally better-off households, the Spanish system is particularly deficient 
at protecting poor children. In contrast, child-related policies play an important role 
redistributing income and reducing child poverty in the other analysed countries. 
Despite the substantial increase after the recent reform, the expenditure on child-related 
policies in Spain (under the 2003 system) is well below other EU countries. Moreover, this 
increase was mainly due to higher tax reliefs. The reform has also introduced for the first time 
a non-income-related benefit in Spain. However, since this new benefit is targeted on working 
mothers with children aged under 3, its coverage is limited and reinforces the apparently 
regressive distribution of child protection. As a result, after the reform the Spanish child-
related policies are less efficient at reducing child poverty and redistribute income towards the 
better-off children.   
Reforms using the policies from the other countries analysed in this paper would dramatically 
reshape the child-related benefits in Spain. On the one hand they would cost considerably 
more than the present system. Therefore, the cost of the simulated reforms presented here 
makes them hardly feasible for the Spanish government in the short term. However, the recent 
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reforms indicate that there may be resources - and the political and public will - to further 
increase the expenditure on child-related policies in the medium-term and long-term. These 
policies would be very effective redistributing income towards poorer children and reducing 
child poverty.  
In a static and narrow analysis, income-related benefits, such as the British Family Credit, are 
the most attractive and efficient policies to redistribute income and reduce child poverty. 
However, the literature shows that this type of policies is not exempt from criticism when 
analysed from a wider perspective. Atkinson (1993) identifies three major problems in 
targeting family benefits according to income. First, there is the problem of “imperfect 
targeting” of income-related-benefits. Eligible families may not be awarded due to 
administrative errors or non-take-up. Conversely, non eligible families could be awarded due 
to control failure or fraud. There is substantial evidence about non-take-up problems with 
income-related-benefits in the UK. According to DWP (2001), in 1999 the Family Credit was 
the British income-tested benefit with lowest take-up rate (66 percent of entitled caseloads). 
In fact, one of the objectives of its replacement by the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) 
was the reduction of ‘stigma associated with claiming in-work support, and encourages higher 
take-up’ (HM Treasury, 2000). The elimination or, at least, minimisation of this first 
difficulty causes a second problem: administrative costs. In a world of imperfect and 
asymmetric information, targeting derives to a “principal-agent problem”: government aims to 
induce all eligible to claim and ensure that all claimants are in fact eligible. Expenditure on 
advertisement and income-test verification may result in considerable deadweight costs and 
significant inefficiency. This would be especially important in Spain where there is little 
tradition in administering income-related-benefits, persistent tax evasion and a considerable 
informal economy (Laparra and Aguilar, 1997). This lack of know-how can put at risk a 
reliable assessment of income at a reasonable administrative cost. Regarding the British 
Family Credit, the administrative cost is especially high because it does not only require 
controlling the household income but also the number of each parents’ working hours per 
week
29. The third problem, work incentives, has been in the centre of economic analysis in the 
last decades. With effective marginal tax rates close to a 100 percent, income-tested benefits 
maintain disposable income virtually unchanged for a wide range of gross earnings, reducing 
the incentive to work. In-work benefits, such as the Family Credit, try to avoid this poverty 
                                                 
29 For more on the administrative characteristics of British in-work benefits see Brewer et al (2001). 
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trap by conditioning the income-related-benefit to work. However, the existence of an income 
test suppresses the work incentive in two ways. First, the reduction or elimination of the 
benefit beyond a given threshold provides few financial incentives to the beneficiaries to 
search for a better-paid job. While successfully preventing full dependency on social 
protection (claiming social assistance or unemployment benefit), it is less clear that in-work 
benefits provide incentives for beneficiaries to achieve full independence in the medium or 
long-term (Evans, 1996; Brewer, 2000). Second, in-work benefits tend to be jointly assessed 
on the couple’s income
30. As a result, the second earner (usually the woman) faces higher 
marginal tax rates and lower work incentives
31. This problem is particularly relevant in Spain. 
Section 2 shows that, in contrast to the UK, child poverty in Spain is mainly related to one-
earner families. Therefore, increasing work incentives for the second-earner is crucial to 
reduce child poverty and long-term welfare dependence in Spain.  
Non-income-related benefits (such as the Danish family allowance and the German and 
British child benefit) are less likely to have these problems, however these policies cost 
noticeably more to reach a similar reduction on child poverty.  
Regarding policy recommendations, further analysis would be needed in order to draw firm 
conclusions about which type of child-related policies would be the most appropriate to 
Spain. However, the evidence presented here represents an important step in this direction. On 
the one hand, it shows that microsimulation is a valuable tool for future research in this area. 
On the other hand, it demonstrates that the recent reforms implemented in Spain reinforce a 
model of child protection that produces outcomes that could be much improved and that has 
no similarity with the systems of other EU countries that have more experience in family 
policy.  
                                                 
30 This is the case in the UK Family Credit (now WFTC) and the US EITC. 
31 Immervoll (2002) shows that British working women face higher marginal effective tax rates than working 
men in the bottom of the household income distribution. 
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Table 1.  Children and Child Poverty Rates By Number of Household Earners 
Spain Denmark France Germany UK
Proportion of children living in households with :
0 earner 11.2% 9.0% 9.7% 13.1% 21.4%
1 earner 55.5% 27.7% 40.8% 46.9% 31.3%
2+ earners 33.3% 63.2% 49.5% 40.1% 47.3%
Child Poverty (headcount ratio)
0 earner 58.4% 17.5% 40.7% 50.0% 69.8%
1 earner 21.0% 8.5% 12.4% 11.7% 25.4%
2+ earners 9.1% 2.2% 2.7% 5.1% 9.1%
All 21.2% 5.4% 10.4% 14.0% 27.1%
Poverty line (equivalent household disposable income per month in 1998 euros)
z 359 818 666 665 624 
Notes: The poverty line is computed as 60% of median equivalent household income before child-targeted 
benefits (see section 3), per month. The equivalence scale used is the modified OECD. The poverty rates include 
child-targeted benefits, even though the poverty line is drawn without them. Euro exchange rates in December 
31st 1998 were: Spain: 166.386; Denmark: 7.46; France: 6.56; Germany: 1.96; UK: 0.70. Earners are defined as 
all household members that receive employment or self-employment income. 
Source: EUROMOD 
 
Table 2.  Children By Household Type 
Spain Denmark France Germany UK
Proportion of children living in households formed by:
Lone-parents 2.6% 12.8% 7.7% 20.0% 19.1%
Couples with children 68.1% 75.2% 76.6% 62.6% 69.2%
"Other adults" and children 29.3% 12.0% 15.8% 17.0% 11.4% 
Notes: Lone-parent families are one-adult households. Households that include a one-parent family and other 
adults are defined as "Other adults" households. "Other adults" households also include couples with children 
who share the household with other adults (including sons and daughters aged 18 or more). 
Source: EUROMOD 
  27 
Table 3.  Child-targeted policies simulated in EUROMOD 1998 
      Tax-reliefs Income  related
benefits 
Non income related 
benefits 
Housing benefits  Childcare  Social assistance 
Spain  o  Income Tax - Child 
Tax credit 
o  Income-tested Child 
benefit 
    
Denmark    o  Family Allowances 
o  Ordinary Child 
Benefit 
o  Extra Child Benefit 
o  Special Child Benefit 
o  Multi Child Benefit 
o  Housing benefit 
o  Housing allowance 
o  Day-care subsidy  o  Social Assistance 
 
 
Germany  o  Income Tax - Child 
Tax Allowance 
o  Lone Parent 
Allowance 
o  Child Raising 
Allowance 
o  Post Natal Benefit for 
Non-Earning Mothers
o  Child Benefit  o  Housing benefit    o  Social Assistance 
 
France  o  Income Tax (Family 
Ratio) 
o  Special Contribution 
on Pensions  (Family 
Ratio) 
o  Special Contribution 
on Unemployment 
(Family Ratio) 
o  Young Children 
Allowance  
o  Family Complement 
o  Education Related 
Family Benefit 
o  Family Allowance   o  Housing benefit    o  Minimum Income 
Guarantee 




o  Lone Parent 
Allowance 
o  Family Credit 
 
o  Child Benefit  o  Housing benefit 
o  Council tax benefit 
  o  Income Support 
Spain 2003  o  Income Tax - Child 
Tax allowance 
o  Income-tested Child 
benefit 
o  Working mother tax 
credit 
   
Note: For detailed descriptions of each country’s tax-benefit systems see the Country Reports, available at www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/mu/emod.htm
  
Table 4.  Child-related benefits: expenditure and coverage in EU countries 1998 










Aggregate expenditure as percentage of household disposable income 
Spain  0.67%  0.52%  0.14% - -  -  -
Denmark   3.23%  -  - 2.81% 0.19%  0.13%  0.22%
France  4.36%  1.20%  0.84% 1.69% 0.55%  -  0.09%
Germany   3.08%  0.26%  0.33% 2.40% 0.01%  -  0.08%
UK  2.98%  0.03%  0.41% 1.85% 0.08%  -  0.66%
Percentage of children living in households that receive some benefit 
Spain  95.5%  78.7%  19.2% - -  -  -
Denmark   100.0%  -  - 100.0% 8.4%  5.8%  2.7%
France  96.4%  69.3%  57.0% 70.8% 38.8%  -  3.4%
Germany   100.0%  15.8%  10.5% 96.0% 1.4%  -  3.9%
UK  97.8%  5.1%  11.1% 97.8% 4.6%  -  26.1%
Source: EUROMOD. 
 
Table 5.  Distribution of expenditure per child per decile in EU countries [% of average expenditure per child] 
  Spain  Denmark France Germany    UK 
1 114.90% 181.78% 128.72% 117.21% 160.22%
2 93.55% 169.79% 115.32% 115.63%  145.28%
3 96.15% 104.64% 103.89% 101.58%  101.02%
4 94.74% 87.35% 96.95% 98.11% 75.82%
5 96.27% 83.51% 89.09% 87.52% 68.38%
6 97.46% 76.26% 83.85% 90.37% 63.40%
7 94.45% 73.13% 80.76% 85.95% 60.61%
8 101.46% 72.57% 76.15% 86.24%  61.44%
9 101.69% 73.25% 77.14% 92.24%  61.46%
10 100.45% 71.27% 101.57% 98.66%  62.32%
Note: Average expenditure per child per decile normalised by overall mean. Deciles were calculated using equivalent 
household disposable income without child-targeted benefits. Equivalence scale used: modified OECD. 
Source: EUROMOD. 
  
Table 6.  Child poverty in EU countries  
 














Poverty Incidence (FGT, α = 0) 
Spain  23.0% 21.2%  21.6% 22.8% 23.0% 23.0%  23.0%  23.0%
Denmark   13.1% 5.4%  13.1% 13.1% 7.7% 12.3%  12.4%  12.3%
France  27.9% 10.4%  27.1% 24.0% 21.1% 24.6%  27.9%  27.6%
Germany   26.8% 14.0%  26.3% 24.8% 16.1% 26.5%  26.8%  25.6%
UK  38.1% 27.1%  38.0% 36.4% 34.0% 37.6%  38.1%  35.7%
Poverty Intensity (FGT, α = 1) 
Spain  7.9%  7.1%  7.7% 7.3% 7.9% 7.9%  7.9%  7.9%
Denmark   3.7%  1.2%  3.7% 3.7% 1.7% 3.1%  3.3%  3.5%
France  8.1%  1.6%  8.0% 5.9% 4.5% 5.9%  8.1%  7.7%
Germany   10.7%  5.8%  10.6% 9.7% 6.6% 10.6%  10.7%  10.2%
UK  14.4%  4.6%  14.4% 12.4% 9.8% 14.0%  14.4%  10.6%
Poverty Severity (FGT, α = 2) 
Spain  4.2%  3.6%  4.2% 3.7% 4.2% 4.2%  4.2%  4.2%
Denmark   1.8%  0.5%  1.8% 1.8% 0.8% 1.4%  1.4%  1.7%
France  3.3%  0.4%  3.2% 2.0% 1.3% 2.1%  3.3%  3.0%
Germany   7.6%  3.8%  7.5% 6.6% 4.4% 7.6%  7.6%  7.4%
UK  6.8%  1.2%  6.8% 5.6% 3.7% 6.6%  6.8%  4.2%
Notes: The poverty line is computed as 60% of median equivalent household income before child-targeted benefits per month 
(see section 3 and Table 1 for details). Equivalence scale used: modified OECD. 
Source: EUROMOD. 
 
Table 7.  Child-related benefits and child poverty incidence per household type in EU countries 
Spain Denmark France Germany UK
Expenditure on child-related benefits per child per household type (as % of overall average expenditure per child )
Lone-parents 109.9% 234.8% 135.5% 123.0% 168.8%
Couples with children 95.1% 79.6% 93.1% 95.0% 82.9%
"Other adults" and children 109.3% 85.5% 115.0% 94.5% 91.8%
Child poverty incidence (FGT, a = 0) excluding all child-related policies 
Lone-parents 49.4% 37.4% 46.5% 50.5% 76.0%
Couples with children 19.5% 9.0% 24.7% 20.4% 29.3%
"Other adults" and children 28.6% 13.3% 34.4% 22.8% 29.2%
Child poverty incidence (FGT, a = 0) including all child-related policies 
Lone-parents 44.7% 5.8% 9.0% 32.3% 49.5%
Couples with children 17.9% 4.9% 8.8% 8.7% 22.3%
"Other adults" and children 27.0% 8.0% 18.3% 12.3% 19.4%
Notes: Measured as average expenditure per child and per household type as a percentage of the average expenditure per child 
of the overall population. Poverty incidence measured as the headcount ratio (FGT, α=0). The poverty line is computed as 60% 
of median equivalent household income before child-targeted benefits per month (see section 3 and Table 1 for details). 
Equivalence scale used: modified OECD. Lone-parent families are one-adult households. Households that include a one-parent 
family and other adults are defined as "Other adults" households. "Other adults" households also include couples with children 
who share the household with other adults (including sons and daughters aged 18 or more). 
Source: EUROMOD. 
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Table  8. Child-related benefits and child poverty incidence per number of children in the 
household in EU countries 
Spain Denmark France Germany UK
Expenditure on child-related benefits per child per household type (as % of overall average expenditure per child )
One child 91.4% 126.4% 73.9% 102.4% 119.5%
Two children 98.6% 92.0% 93.5% 95.5% 91.2%
Three or more children 118.3% 82.3% 127.1% 106.7% 100.2%
Child poverty incidence (FGT, a = 0) excluding all child-related policies 
One child 18.5% 11.1% 14.4% 18.6% 29.5%
Two children 20.3% 9.6% 19.7% 23.5% 28.5%
Three or more children 38.4% 22.9% 48.1% 46.2% 57.0%
Child poverty incidence (FGT, a = 0) including all child-related policies 
One child 17.8% 4.2% 7.5% 14.1% 18.7%
Two children 18.6% 2.2% 8.2% 12.2% 19.5%
Three or more children 35.0% 13.4% 15.1% 17.6% 43.0%
Notes: Measured as average expenditure per child and per household type as a percentage of the average expenditure per child 
of the overall population. Poverty incidence measured as the headcount ratio (FGT, α=0). The poverty line is computed as 60% 
of median equivalent household income before child-targeted benefits per month (see section 3 and Table 1 for details). 
Equivalence scale used: modified OECD. 
Source: EUROMOD. 
 
Table 9.  Child-related benefits: expenditure and coverage in Spain 










Aggregate expenditure as percentage of household disposable income 
Spain 2003 system  1.3%  0.9%  0.2% 0.2% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Danish system  3.9%  0.0%  0.0% 3.2% 0.0%  0.0%  0.6%
French  system  4.4% 2.2% 0.5% 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3%
German system  4.8% 0.0% 0.2% 4.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4%
British system  4.4% 0.0% 1.7% 2.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4%
Percentage of children living in household that receive some benefit 
Spain 2003 system  93.3%  74.9%  18.5% 8.1% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Danish system  100.0%  0.0%  0.0% 100.0% 0.0%  0.0%  7.8%
French system  95.4%  75.5%  29.9% 54.7% 0.0%  0.0%  4.1%
German system  100.0%  0.0%  5.6% 100.0% 0.0%  0.0%  8.9%
British system  98.5% 0.0%  29.1% 98.5% 0.0% 0.0% 7.2%
Source: EUROMOD. 
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Table 10. Distribution of child-related benefits per child and decile in Spain [% of average expenditure per 
child] 
  Spain 2003 system  Danish system  French system  German system  British system 
1 69.4% 149.8% 106.8% 143.8%  221.7%
2 48.0% 115.7% 94.8% 100.6%  153.6%
3 61.2% 104.5% 96.9% 100.1%  123.5%
4 81.6% 96.8% 98.1% 101.0% 75.4%
5 87.6% 91.3% 91.5% 97.0% 71.6%
6 91.6% 85.6% 90.0% 90.6% 67.2%
7 99.9% 81.6% 91.1% 87.8% 54.8%
8 134.9% 84.9% 101.3% 88.3%  57.7%
9 151.9% 85.5% 92.6% 85.9%  54.8%
10 183.6% 80.6% 127.7% 84.7%  53.8%
Note: Average expenditure per child per decile normalised by overall mean. Deciles were calculated using equivalent 
household disposable income without child-targeted benefits. Equivalence scale used: modified OECD. 
Source: EUROMOD. 
 
Table 11. Child poverty in Spain 














Poverty Incidence (FGT, α = 0) 
Spain 2003 system  23.0% 21.0%  21.7% 22.2% 22.0% 22.5%  22.5%  22.5%
Danish system  23.0% 13.4%  23.0% 23.0% 15.1% 23.0%  23.0%  21.5%
French system  23.0% 12.9%  21.1% 19.8% 17.8% 23.0%  23.0%  21.9%
German system  23.0% 11.8% 23.0% 22.1% 13.9% 23.0%  23.0%  22.6%
British system  23.0% 7.7% 23.0% 13.2% 17.4% 23.0%  23.0%  22.2%
Poverty Intensity (FGT, α = 1) 
Spain 2003 system  7.9% 7.0%  7.9% 7.2% 7.9% 8.0%  8.0%  8.0%
Danish system  7.9% 3.6%  7.9% 7.9% 4.5% 7.9%  7.9%  6.7%
French system  7.9% 3.9%  7.7% 6.4% 5.5% 7.9%  7.9%  7.2%
German system  7.9% 2.5% 7.9% 7.5% 3.9% 7.9%  7.9%  6.4%
British system  7.9% 1.4% 7.9% 3.7% 5.5% 7.9%  7.9%  6.8%
Poverty Severity (FGT, α = 2) 
Spain 2003 system  4.2% 3.6%  4.3% 3.6% 4.3% 4.3%  4.3%  4.3%
Danish system  4.2% 1.6%  4.2% 4.2% 2.1% 4.2%  4.2%  3.4%
French system  4.2% 1.8%  4.2% 3.2% 2.6% 4.2%  4.2%  3.8%
German system  4.2% 0.8% 4.2% 3.9% 1.7% 4.2%  4.2%  2.7%
British system  4.2% 0.4% 4.2% 1.7% 2.6% 4.2%  4.2%  3.3%
Notes: The poverty line is computed as 60% of median equivalent household income before child-targeted benefits per month 
(see section 3 and Table 1 for details). Equivalence scale used: modified OECD. 
Source: EUROMOD. 
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Expenditure on child-related benefits per child per household type (as % of overall average expenditure per child )
Lone-parents 66.8% 201.1% 144.8% 113.3% 150.3%
Couples with children 107.8% 86.5% 96.5% 90.9% 87.7%
"Other adults" and children 84.2% 106.7% 103.2% 109.6% 123.6%
Child poverty incidence (FGT, a = 0) including all child-related policies 
Lone-parents 46.9% 9.9% 18.9% 23.8% 19.6%
Couples with children 17.5% 11.1% 10.9% 9.8% 5.3%
"Other adults" and children 26.8% 19.0% 17.1% 15.4% 12.1%  
Notes: Measured as average expenditure per child and per household type as a percentage of the average expenditure per child 
of the overall population. Poverty incidence measured as the headcount ratio (FGT, α=0). The poverty line is computed as 60% 
of median equivalent household income before child-targeted benefits per month (see section 3 and Table 1 for details). 
Equivalence scale used: modified OECD. Lone-parent families are one-adult households. Households that include a one-parent 
family and other adults is defined as "Other adults" households. "Other adults" households also include couples with children 
who share the household with other adults (including sons and daughters aged 18 or more).Source: EUROMOD. 
 
Table  13.  Child-related benefits and child poverty incidence per number of children in the 











Expenditure on child-related benefits per child per household type (as % of overall average expenditure per child )
One child 104.1% 109.7% 67.6% 98.2% 115.3%
Two children 97.0% 88.7% 102.5% 91.5% 91.3%
Three or more children 102.3% 91.5% 145.2% 111.4% 100.2%
Child poverty incidence (FGT, a = 0) including all child-related policies 
One child 18.0% 11.8% 14.9% 13.5% 8.9%
Two children 18.2% 11.9% 11.1% 11.1% 6.3%
Three or more children 34.4% 20.4% 15.0% 11.1% 9.7%
Notes: Measured as average expenditure per child and per household type as a percentage of the average expenditure per child 
of the overall population. Poverty incidence measured as the headcount ratio (FGT, α=0). The poverty line is computed as 60% 
of median equivalent household income before child-targeted benefits per month (see section 3 and Table 1 for details). 
Equivalence scale used: modified OECD. 
Source: EUROMOD. 
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Figure  1.  Distribution of expenditure per child per decile in EU countries [% of average 

























































































































  34Appendix 1.  Child-related benefits in 1998 
  Name  Type  Target  Child definition





Amount varies with  Taxed 
          Emp
2 Hrs
3 Ch






DK  Family allowance  Non-income-related 
benefit 
All children  <18  No  No  >0  1,475 €
  Yes, Prop  Yes ↓  No        No No No






  <18               
           
               
               
               
           
       
       
No  >0 No   622 €   Yes,  Prop
  No No No No No




Lone parents  <18  No  No  >0  475 €
  No No No No No No




Lone or disable parents 
without alimony pay 
<18 No  >0 No   1,193 €   Yes,  Prop
  No No No No No




Lone or disable parents 
with twins 
<7 No  >1 No   770 €   Yes,  Prop
  No No No No No
  Housing benefit  House benefit  Families  with  rented 
accommodation 
<23 No  No No   -
dk2 - No No No No No
  Housing allowance  House benefit  Low income families  <18  No  No  No  -
dk2 - No No No No IT
  Day care subsidy  Childcare  Low income families  <6  No  No  >0  3,629 €




No No No No
  Social assistance  Social assistance  Low income families  <18  No  No  No  310 €
dk3 No No No No No IT
FR  Income tax  Tax relief  Quotient familial  <18; <21 inc; <25 edu, inc -  -  No  1/2 part
fr1 Yes, MP  No  No  No  No  - 
  “Csg” special contribution on 
unemployment benefit 
Tax relief  Quotient familial  <18; <21 inc; <25 edu, inc -  -  No  1/2 part
fr1 Yes, MP  No  No  No  No  - 
  “Csg” special contribution on 
pensions 
Tax relief  Quotient familial  <18; <21 inc; <25 edu, inc -  -  No  1/2 part
fr1 Yes, MP  No  No  No  No  - 
  Family benefit  Non-income-related 
benefit 
Child benefit  <16; <19 inc; <20 edu, inc No
 c No  >1  1,250 €
fr2 Yes, MP
  a Yes ↑  Yes
 b No
 c No
  CRDS, RMI
d
  Young children allowance   Income-related benefit  Young child benefit  <3  No
 c No  >0  1,791 €
  No
 a No  No
 b No
 c No
  CRDS, RMI
d
  Family complement   Income-related benefit  Families with 3 or more 
children  
>2 and <16; <19 inc; <20 
edu, inc 
No
 c No  >2  1,625 €
  No
 a No  No
 b No
 c No
  CRDS, RMI
d
  Education related family benefit Income-related benefit  Children in education  >5 & <18 edu, in soc assist No  No  >0  633 €
  Yes, Prop
 a No  No  No  No  CRDS, RMI
d
  Education related family benefit Income-related benefit  Children in education  >5 & <18 edu   No  No  >0  243 €
  Yes, Prop




Housing benefit  Housing benefit  Families with rent or 
mortgage 
<20 inc  No  No  No  -
fr3 -  No  No  No  No  No 
  Minimum income guarantee 
(rmi) 
Social assistance  Low income families  <15; <20 edu   No  No  No  1,333 €
  Yes, MP  No  Yes ↑  No  No  No 
  Lone parent benefit   Social assistance  Lone parent families  <17; <19 edu   No  No  >0  7,800 €
  Yes, Prop  No  -  No  No  AS, RMI, IB 
continues…  
 
  Name  Type  Target  Child definition





Amount varies with  Taxed 
          Emp
2 Hrs
3 Ch






D  Lone parent tax allowance  Tax relief 
(tax allowance) 
Lone parent families  <17; <22 edu  No  No  >0  2,871 € 
  No          No -  No No -
  Child tax allowance  Tax relief  Children  of  medium-
high income taxpayers 
<19; <22 edu, inc; <28, 
unemp, inc 
No                 
                 
                 
       
               
       
No >0  3,533  €
  Yes,  Prop No - No No -
  Child benefit  Non-income-related 
benefit 
All children   <19; <22 edu, inc; <28, 
unemp, inc 
No No >0  1,350  €  Yes,  MP No - No No No




Non working mothers  <1  Yes 
g No >0  76  € Yes,  Prop No No No No SAB
  Child raising allowance  
(federal and per länder) 
Income-related benefit  Young children  <3  No  Yes 
e >0
  3,067 € 
ge1 Yes, Prop  Yes ↑  No No No SAB
  Housing benefit  Housing  benefit  Families with rent or
mortgage 
  <24 No  No No  - 
ge2 - No No No No No
  Social assistance  
(federal and per länder) 
Social assistance   Low income families  <17  No  No  >0  1,920 € 
ge3 Yes, Prop  Yes ↑ Yes  ↑  No No No




<16; <19 edu   No  No  >0  405 €    No  No  -  No  No  - 
  Child benefit  Non-income-related 
benefit 
Children  <16; <19 edu   No  No  >0  690 €    Yes, LP  No  Yes ↑  No  No  Income support; 
housing and council 
tax benefit 
  Family credit  Income-related benefit  Children in working 
families 
<16; <19 edu  Yes  >16  >0  4,522 €    Yes, LP  Yes ↑  No  No  Yes ↑  Housing benefit; 
council tax benefit 
  Council tax benefit  Housing benefit  Low income families  <16; <19 edu  No  No  No  - 
uk1 Yes, LP
 a Yes ↑
 a Yes ↑
 b No  No  No 
  Housing benefit  Housing benefit  Low income families 
with rent 
<16; <19 edu  No  No  No  - 
uk2 Yes, LP
 a Yes ↑  Yes ↑  No  No  No 
  Income support  Social assistance   LP, unemp, pens & 
disable parents 




  Name  Type  Target  Child definition





Amount varies with  Taxed 
          Emp
2 Hrs
3 Ch






E  Child tax credit 1998  Tax relief  
(Tax credit) 
Children  <30 inc  No  No  >0  150 €    Yes, MP  No  No 
h No      No -
  Child benefit 1998 
i Income-related benefit  Children in low income 
families 
<18 inc   No  No  >0  245 €    Yes, Prop  No  No 
h No     
     
                 
     
No No
  Child tax allowance 2003  Tax relief 
(Tax allowance) 
Children  <25 inc  No  No  >0  1,211 €    Yes, MP  Yes ↓  No 
h No No -
  Working mother refundable tax 
credit 2003 
Tax relief  
(Ref tax credit) 
Working mothers w/
young children 
  <3 Yes  No >0  1,400  €  Yes,  MP No No No No -
  Child benefit 2003 
i Income-related benefit  Children in low income 
families 
<18 inc   No  No  >0  252 €    Yes, Prop  No  No 
h No No No
Notes: 
1 Age limit (<30), income limit (inc), must be in education (edu), must be unemployed (unemp).  
2 Employment statuses of parents. 
3 Number of hours worked by parents. 
4 Number 
of children . 
5 Annual amount for a household with one new-born child and with no income.  
6 Age of children. 
7 Lone parent.   
dk1 Average annual cost of a nursery in 1998  
dk2 The amount depends on rent payments 
dk3 Difference between maximum social assistance benefit for an eligible person with and 
without children.  
fr1 One part if first child of a lone parent.  
fr2 For second child in the household.  
fr3 The amount depends on rent or mortgage payments  
ge1 Amount for the Federal 
child raising allowance.  
ge2 The amount depends on rent or mortgage payments.  
ge3 Amount for west Germany and east Berlin.  
it1 Difference between family benefit for a couple 
with very low income and no children and the same income and 1 child.   
uk1 The amount depends on council tax payments   
uk2 The amount depends on rent payments   
a Income-test disregard changes with the number or age of children. 
b Income-test disregard changes if it is a single or lone parent family. 
c Income-test disregard changes with the 
number of employed parents . 
d CRDS – Special social contribution on family benefits. 
e Not eligible if mother works more than 19 hours per week. 
f Income-test disregard increases 
with age of children. 
g Not eligible if mother has employment income. 
h Lone parents are allowed to choose the joint scheme of taxation.  
i There are two child benefits, one for social 
security contributors and other those who do not contribute. However, eligibility conditions and amount of the benefit is the same in both policies. EUROMOD take them as one 
benefit. These benefits have special rules (no age or income limit and higher amount of benefit) for disable children. Due to lack of data these special rules are not simulated in 
EUROMOD. 
For detailed descriptions of each country’s tax-benefit systems see the Country Reports, available at www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/mu/emod.htm
 37